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Impact benefit agreements (IBAs) have become a popular tool to manage and mitigate 
the impacts of resource development activities, and share the monetary and/or non-
monetary benefits from development activities with impacted communities. The largely 
confidential nature of these agreements has made it difficult for communities to learn 
from past agreements and associated outcomes. This report provides practical 
recommendations for designing equitable fiscal regimes in IBAs. This report identifies, 
describes, and qualitatively assesses fiscal instruments and systems for extractive 
industries using a set of potential community objectives. Then, a method to quantitatively 
evaluate alternative fiscal regimes is employed for the base metal mining sector, using a 
modified discounted cash flow model of a representative base metal mine. The results 
suggest that more aggressive fiscal regimes could be negotiated for IBAs in the base 
metal mining sector while still ensuring that a given resource project is economically 
viable. The study also suggests that combining a few fiscal instruments can help to 
balance between the inherent trade-offs of a given fiscal instrument.  
Keywords:  impact benefit agreement; community development; sustainable 






I would like to thank my supervisor, Tom Gunton, for the consistent support, 
advice, and patience that he has given and shown me throughout my time in REM. Tom, 
thank you for pushing me outside of my comfort zone and into the world of resource 
economics. As you once said to me, the less you know about something, the more the 
reason to do it.  
Thank you to the members of REM’s Impact Benefit Agreements Lab. As a 
whole, you all have helped to guide me through this process and, together, I hope our 
collaborative research makes a meaningful and practical impact.  
Thank you to all of the support and encouragement from my dear fREMds. You 
all have truly made my time in REM exciting, engaging, and memorable.  
Thank you, Mum, Pops, Nana, Papa and Auntie, for your encouragement and 
support, especially in the later stages of this degree.  
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the financial support given to me by the 
Canadian International Resource Development Institute, the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council, and Simon Fraser University.  
v 
Table of Contents 
Declaration of Committee ............................................................................................. ii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iv 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................viii 
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Purpose and Rationale of Report ........................................................................... 2 
1.2. Report Methodology .............................................................................................. 3 
1.3. Structure of Report ................................................................................................ 4 
Chapter 2. Background & Context ............................................................................ 5 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 5 
2.2. Extractive Industries and Their Characteristics ...................................................... 5 
2.3. What Are Fiscal Regimes and Why Do They Matter? ............................................ 6 
2.4. Potential Community Objectives ............................................................................ 7 
Chapter 3. Fiscal Instruments and Systems for Extractive Industries ................. 10 
3.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 10 
3.2. Literature Review Methods .................................................................................. 10 
3.3. Bonuses .............................................................................................................. 10 
3.4. Cash Bonus Bidding ............................................................................................ 12 
3.5. Royalties.............................................................................................................. 14 
3.5.1. Specific Rate/Volumetric Royalties .............................................................. 15 
3.5.2. Value-Based/Ad Valorem Royalties ............................................................. 17 
3.5.3. Profit-Based Royalties ................................................................................. 21 
3.6. Taxes .................................................................................................................. 22 
3.6.1. Property Tax ................................................................................................ 22 
3.6.2. Lease Fee ................................................................................................... 23 
3.6.3. Economic Rent-Based Tax .......................................................................... 24 
3.7. Hybrid Regimes ................................................................................................... 26 
3.8. Production-Sharing Contracts .............................................................................. 27 
3.9. Service Contracts ................................................................................................ 32 
3.10. Joint Ventures ................................................................................................. 32 
3.11. Qualitative Comparison of Fiscal Tools and Systems to Potential Community 
Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 4. An Evaluation of Fiscal Regimes Negotiated in the Base Metal Mining 
Sector  ................................................................................................................. 37 
4.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 37 
4.2. Evaluation Methods ............................................................................................. 38 
vi 
4.3. Results ................................................................................................................ 48 
4.4. Discussion of Results .......................................................................................... 53 
Chapter 5. Recommendations and Conclusion ...................................................... 55 
5.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 55 
5.2. Recommendations ............................................................................................... 55 
5.3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 56 
References ................................................................................................................... 58 
 
vii 
List of Tables 
Table 1. A list of potential community objectives for fiscal regimes from the 
perspective of an Indigenous or subnational government. ........................ 8 
Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Bonuses .......................................... 11 
Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Cash Bonus Bidding ........................ 13 
Table 4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Volumetric Royalties ........................ 17 
Table 5. Royalty values at various valuation points for crushed and screened bulk 
ore (e.g., iron ore and manganese) sold to an export market (Guj et al., 
2013). ..................................................................................................... 19 
Table 6. Royalty values for base metals (e.g., zinc, copper, and lead) at various 
valuation points (Guj et al., 2013). .......................................................... 19 
Table 7. Royalty values for gold at various valuation points (Guj et al., 2013). ..... 20 
Table 8. Advantages and Disadvantages of Ad Valorem Royalties ...................... 21 
Table 9. Advantages and Disadvantages of Profit-Based Royalties ..................... 22 
Table 10. Advantages and Disadvantages of Property Taxes ................................ 23 
Table 11. Advantages and Disadvantages of Lease Fees...................................... 24 
Table 12. Advantages and Disadvantages of Economic Rent-Based Taxes .......... 26 
Table 13. Advantages and Disadvantages of Hybrid Regimes ............................... 27 
Table 14. Advantages and Disadvantages of Production-Sharing Contracts. The 
advantages and disadvantages of PSC systems are not uniform. Instead, 
they depend on the specific terms of any given PSC. ............................. 31 
Table 15. Advantages and Disadvantages of Joint Ventures. ................................ 35 
Table 16. Qualitative comparison matrix of fiscal instruments and systems used in 
revenue-sharing agreements. ................................................................. 36 
Table 17. Description of the analysed fiscal regimes and their respective mining 
projects. All agreements have been made available at: 
http://www.sfu.ca/rem/planning/research/IBA/Database.html ................. 44 
Table 18. Hypothetical base metal project: key assumptions. ................................ 46 
Table 19. Community range in annual income throughout all project phases, for 
each fiscal regime under low, reference and high market price scenarios.
 ............................................................................................................... 50 
 
viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Report methodology ................................................................................. 3 
Figure 2. Volumetric royalty verification process, recreated from Guj et al. (2013). 16 
Figure 3. Production sharing contract flow diagram (Johnston, 1994). Within the 
PSC represented in this diagram, a 10% volumetric royalty is imposed, 
there is a 40% cost recovery ceiling, a fixed profit split of 40%/60%, in 
favour of the governmental entity, and a 40% tax rate. Note that cost 
recovery is calculated using gross production (before royalties) rather 
than net production. ............................................................................... 29 
Figure 4. The distribution of project revenues under a PSC system with a joint 
venture and royalty included (Johnston, 1994). The joint venture in this 
example stipulates a 70%/30% equity split in favour of the private 
contractor. Meanwhile, the PSC stipulates a 60%/40% profit oil split, in 
favour of the private contractor. After royalties and costs are deducted 
from gross revenue, the remaining profit oil is split according to the PSC. 
The remaining profit oil is then split again according to the joint venture. 
As such, in this example, the joint venture acts as another layer of 
taxation. Then, once taxes are deducted from the remaining balance, post 
the joint venture split, the remaining profit oil goes to the private oil 
company. ............................................................................................... 33 
Figure 5. Proportion of resource rent retained by a community under each market 
price scenario. ........................................................................................ 50 
Figure 6. Community income stability (denoted by the coefficient of variation) for 
each fiscal regime under low, reference and high market price scenarios.




List of Acronyms 
BA Benefit Agreement 
BSA Benefit-sharing agreement  
CDA Community development agreement 
CIF Cost, insurance and freight 
CSR Corporate social responsibility  
FOB Free on board 
IBA Impact benefit agreement 
NPV Net present value 
NSR Net smelter return 
NSV Net smelter value 










Chapter 1. Introduction 
Relying on resource extraction to achieve sustainable development is 
challenging. During an economic boom, resource-based communities are forced to cope 
with increased demands on housing, physical infrastructure, and social services (Ryser, 
Markey, Manson, & Halseth, 2014). But volatility in international markets and depletion of 
non-renewable resources complicate long-term planning in resource-based regions 
(Blunt, 2014). When economic downturns occur, resource-based communities 
experience declining employment and revenue that strain public services (Ryser et al., 
2014). Unfortunately, if the economic downturn persists, the resource-based community 
may be unable to provide these services, and the community will depopulate and/or 
remain in distress. Moreover, the benefits and costs of large-scale resource 
development are often unevenly distributed, with much of the revenue from mining 
accruing to the private firms extracting the resource, while the large social and 
environmental costs are felt at the local level (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013).  
To help address the adverse environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
resource development, impacted communities around the world have been negotiating 
bilateral agreements with private resource developers and/or senior governments to 
provide a more equitable sharing of benefits (Nwapi, 2017; Söderholm & Svahn, 2015; 
Tordo, Johnston, & Johnston, 2010). These agreements are generally classified as 
benefit agreements (BAs) but are also referred to as community development 
agreements (CDAs), benefit-sharing agreements (BSAs), and impact and benefit 
agreements (IBAs). For consistency throughout this report, these agreements will be 
referred to as IBAs.   
Negotiating an IBA can be beneficial to both the local or Indigenous community 
impacted by resource development and the project proponent. These project-specific 
benefit agreements typically include preferential Indigenous or local access to 
employment and business development opportunities, opportunities for community 
development, Indigenous or local participation in environmental management, and 
stipulations for the sharing of project revenues (Natural Resources Canada, 2016; 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2016; O’Faircheallaigh & Gibson, 2012; Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon, & 
Schott, 2018). IBAs can also help the project proponent gain community consent for the 
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proposed activity, meet international standards of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
cultivate and maintain a good reputation, and reduce uncertainty and investment risk 
associated with project approval and construction (Blunt, 2014; Craik, Gardner, & 
McCarthy, 2017; Lapierre & Bradshaw, 2008; Tysiachniouk & Petrov, 2018)). 
1.1. Purpose and Rationale of Report 
IBAs are generally confidential in nature. As such, the unavailability of these 
agreements has limited their study to a select number of researchers (Craik et al., 2017). 
Additionally, much of the current literature on IBAs is better oriented towards the 
governance community rather than impacted communities. Previous studies have mainly 
focused on the purpose of IBAs (Blunt, 2014; Gibson, 2006; Papillon & Rodon, 2017; 
Söderholm & Svahn, 2015; Tysiachniouk & Petrov, 2018), how and if IBAs can be 
integrated into existing regulatory processes (Galbraith, Bradshaw, & Rutherford, 2007; 
Gibson, 2006), and the power dynamics within and surrounding IBA negotiation 
processes (Blunt, 2014; Caine & Krogman, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). Other studies 
have focused on guidelines and best practices for negotiation IBAs (e.g. 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2016; Cascaden, 2018). However, there has been very little research 
on how to design fiscal instruments in IBAs to achieve community objectives (Gunton et 
al. 2020).  
This report addresses this gap in the literature by evaluating alternative fiscal 
instruments and systems used in IBAs for sharing monetary benefits between project 
developers and communities.  
The purpose of this report is to:  
1. Review and synthesise existing literature on fiscal instruments and systems 
to highlight the advantages and disadvantages associated with each 
instrument and system 
2.  Develop and employ a methodology to quantitatively evaluate and compare 
fiscal regimes negotiated for IBAs 
3. Gain and share insights on best practices for fiscal regime design and IBA 
negotiation 
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1.2. Report Methodology 
An overview of the steps taken to complete this report can be found in Figure 1. 
First, a literature review was conducted. This literature review focused on the fiscal 
instruments and systems that can be used to share revenues from resource 
development activities. Through this literature review, a set of potential community 
objectives was synthesised. These potential community objectives were then used as a 
standard to identify the qualitative advantages and disadvantages of various fiscal 
instruments and systems. To quantitatively compare alternative fiscal regimes, a set of 
quantitative evaluative criteria and associated indicators was developed – again, using 
the list of potential community objectives. This set of quantitative evaluative criteria was 
then used to evaluate the performance of alternative fiscal regimes, whose outcomes 
were estimated using a financial model.  
 
Figure 1. Report methodology 
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1.3. Structure of Report 
This report is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research area, 
identifies the purpose of this report, and outlines the methodology and structure that this 
report follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the characteristics of extractive 
industries, describes the role of fiscal regimes, emphasises the importance of fiscal 
regime design, and provides an overview of potential community objectives when it 
comes to outcomes associated with fiscal regime implementation. Chapter 3 describes 
alternative fiscal instruments and systems that can be used to share resource revenues 
and identifies their respective advantages and disadvantages in relation to the potential 
community objectives described in Chapter 2.4. Chapter 4 uses quantitative evaluative 
criteria and financial modeling to evaluate the performance of alternative fiscal regimes 
for the base metal mining sector. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings of this 
report and provides recommendations for fiscal regime design. 
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Chapter 2. Background & Context 
2.1. Introduction 
To adequately describe the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges of each 
fiscal system and instrument used for petroleum and mineral extraction projects, it is 
important to understand the basic characteristics of extractive industries as well as the 
purpose of well-designed fiscal regimes for the extractive sector. Consequently, this 
chapter describes the special characteristics of extractive industries, describes the role 
of fiscal regimes, emphasises the importance of fiscal regime design, and provides an 
overview of potential community objectives when it comes to outcomes associated with 
fiscal regime implementation.  
2.2. Extractive Industries and Their Characteristics  
Extractive industries, such as petroleum and/or mineral development projects, 
posses a set of unique characteristics which differentiate them from all other industries. 
Natural resource projects are generally high-risk projects, as they require a substantial 
amount of capital, experience long lead times before any return on investment is 
achieved, demand long exploration and pre-production periods during which there is no 
revenue generated, and are long-term projects whose viability is often tied to highly 
volatile commodity markets, uncertain site geology, uncertain input costs and political 
risk (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; Guj, 2012; Guj, Bocoum, Limerick, Meaton, & 
Maybee, 2013). Additionally, natural resource projects can generate sizeable economic 
rents, or surplus revenues in excess of all costs of production including a normal return 
on capital (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012; 
Guj et al., 2013; T. Gunton & Richards, 1987; Johnston, 1994). Extractive industries are 
also often characterised by the presence of asymmetric information between private 
investors/project developers and host governments. Specifically, the project developers 
are better informed about the technical and commercial aspects of a resource project; 
they are therefore able to calculate a more accurate value of the economic rent 
generated by a project. Meanwhile, the host government is better informed about its 
future fiscal intentions. Lastly, natural resource projects often involve the exploitation of 
exhaustible resources. 
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Although extractive industries may generate economic rent, the magnitude of rent 
is highly variable. As stated above, economic rent is any surplus revenue after 
accounting for or deducting all production costs, including a normal return. Therefore, the 
magnitude of economic rent generated by a resource development project is dependent 
on the type and grade of the mineral deposit, commodity sales prices, and production 
costs. If commodity sales prices were to increase while the cost of production remained 
stable, economic rent would increase. Similarly, if commodity prices remained constant 
but production costs were reduced, the amount of economic rent generated would also 
increase. However, if either production costs increased, or commodity prices decreased, 
the economic rent generated by the resource project would lessen. 
2.3. What Are Fiscal Regimes and Why Do They Matter? 
Natural resource ownership laws often require the ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair’ sharing of 
rents between resource companies and host governments. While extractive industries 
can generate sizeable rents, the ownership of the in-situ resource is not always private; 
in fact, while extraction and marketing of natural resources is often undertaken by private 
firms, ownership of the in-situ resource is commonly held through some form of 
collective ownership by various levels of government, including local and Indigenous 
communities (Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012). Therefore, the distribution of 
resource rent among governments, private sector developers, Indigenous communities 
and other stakeholders is impacted by the legal system governing resource ownership. 
For example, in Canada, most natural resources are owned by the Crown, and 
Indigenous communities have various rights and titles to natural resources that are in the 
process of being defined by the courts. Under this legal framework, the community or 
host government that owns the resource has the right to charge the private developer for 
the publicly owned in-situ natural resource that the private developer is extracting 
(Freebairn, 2015; Garnaut, 2010; T. Gunton, 2003). 
Additionally, the exploitation of non-renewable resources requires the 
reinvestment of economic rent in other forms of capital, and so host governments, on 
behalf of residents, should collect economic rent or other revenues from private resource 
developers to contribute to local sustainability (Hartwick, 1977). Although resource 
revenues must be shared with impacted communities in return for the sale of publicly-
owned resources and to contribute to local sustainability, private investors should at 
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least be compensated at a rate which provides an adequate incentive to explore, 
develop, and produce (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012). 
Proceeds from natural resource production are shared with resource owners 
using fiscal regimes. A fiscal regime is the set of fiscal instruments or tools – such as 
taxes, royalties, bonuses, etc. – which determine how the revenues from natural 
resource developments are shared between companies and resource owners (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 2015). In theory, fiscal regimes should maximize the net 
present value (NPV) of resource owner revenues from extractive industries, and 
therefore resource rents should be targeted for taxation (Fiscal Affairs Department, 
2012; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983).  
How resource owners extract natural resource revenues is important. A poorly 
designed fiscal regime can lead to the over-taxation or under-taxation of an extractive 
industry. Consequently, market distortions and sub-optimal results may follow. For 
example, over-taxation, and the capturing of revenues beyond economic rent, may lead 
to high grading – a selective extraction process in which the highest grade of resource is 
extracted, while the lesser quality resource is left under-developed (Guj, 2012; T. Gunton 
& Richards, 1987). However, the fiscal regime and fiscal instrument choice ultimately 
depends on the strategic objectives and administrative capabilities of the host 
government (Guj, 2012; United Nations Conference on Trade Development, 1995). 
2.4. Potential Community Objectives 
A combination of fiscal instruments should be selected and used to achieve a 
balance between multiple community objectives. The following table (Table 1) provides 
an overview of some potential community objectives which an Indigenous or subnational 
government may have when it comes to receiving revenue from resource development 
activities. These potential community objectives were synthesised through the literature 
review process described in Chapter 3.2.  
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Concerning the optimal sharing 
of economic rent, this objective 
focuses on the maximisation of 
economic rent captured by the 
host government through a fiscal 
regime.  
(Atkins & Macfadyen, 2008; Daniel, 
Goldsworthy, Maliszewski, Mesa 
Puyo, & Watson, 2010; Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 2012; Garnaut, 
2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 
1983; Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 2013; T. 
Gunton & Richards, 1987; Hogan, 
2012; O’Faircheallaigh & Gibson, 
2012; United Nations Conference 
on Trade Development, 1995)  
Administrative 
efficiency 
The amount of administrative 
complexity and cost required to 
audit and manage a given fiscal 
instrument or regime. An optimal 
fiscal regime is one that is 
simple to administer and/or 
aligned with governmental 
capacity and/or value of the 
resource. 
(Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; 
Freebairn, 2015; Garnaut, 2010; 
Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 
2012; Guj et al., 2013; Hogan, 
2012; Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2015; 
O’Faircheallaigh & Gibson, 2012; 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade Development, 1995)  
Neutrality A neutral fiscal regime is one 
that does not distort or alter 
investment or production 
behaviours and decisions. In 
other words, a neutral fiscal 
regime does not distort a 
producers’ after-tax relative to 
pre-tax costs. To accomplish 
true neutrality, no more or no 
less than the economic rent 
must be captured through a 
fiscal regime.  
(Garnaut, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies 
Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 
2013; T. Gunton & Richards, 1987; 
Hogan, 2012; Tordo et al., 2010; 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade Development, 1995)  
Stability of income  Defined as the variability or 
volatility of monetary receipts, 
received by the host 
government, over time. An 
optimal fiscal regime will provide 
relatively stable revenue to a 
host government and/or include 
provisions to guarantee a 
minimum annual income to the 
host government. 
(Freebairn, 2015; Garnaut, 2010; 
Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 
2012; Guj et al., 2013; T. Gunton & 
Richards, 1987; Hogan, 2012; 
O’Faircheallaigh & Gibson, 2012; 
Tordo et al., 2010)  




This objective is concerned with 
the amount of project decision-
making power which a host 
government may have under a 
given fiscal system.  
(T. Gunton & Richards, 1987; 
Johnston, 1994)  
Table 1. A list of potential community objectives for fiscal regimes from the 
perspective of an Indigenous or subnational government. 
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Many of these potential objectives are tied to one-another. Theoretically, a 
neutral fiscal regime will maximise the economic rent generated by a particular resource 
project and therefore also maximise the revenue obtained by the host government. On 
the other hand, a fiscal regime that prioritizes administrative simplicity will usually 
provide the host government with early, stable and predictable revenues (Fiscal Affairs 
Department, 2012; Garnaut, 2010; Hogan, 2012; Tordo et al., 2010). 
There is also an inherent incompatibility amongst a number of the mentioned 
community objectives. Administratively simple systems are not neutral and reduce the 
revenue raising potential of the project, since they do not target economic rents (Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 2012; Garnaut, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012; Guj 
et al., 2013). Meanwhile, neutral systems require control of costs by the host government 
and can be a burden to administer (Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 2013; United Nations 
Conference on Trade Development, 1995). Since several of these potential objectives 
are incompatible, compromises must be made and a balance between objectives must 
be obtained.  
Each individual fiscal instrument has its own unique characteristics. As such, a 
given fiscal package or regime will impact each objective in a different way. Therefore, it 
is important to understand the characteristics and effects of individual fiscal systems and 
tools before designing a fiscal regime. 
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Chapter 3. Fiscal Instruments and Systems for 
Extractive Industries 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide Indigenous or local communities – who 
may find themselves as a negotiating party in one of these agreements – with a general 
understanding of the inherent risks and advantages associated with the use of different 
fiscal systems and instruments. As such, this chapter provides a detailed account of the 
fiscal systems and tools which are used to share revenues between extractive 
companies and owners of property rights, and impacted parties. This chapter finishes 
with a qualitative comparison1 of the fiscal instruments and systems subsequently 
described.   
3.2. Literature Review Methods 
A literature review was completed to identify and analyse the fiscal tools and 
systems which can be used in IBAs and other revenue-sharing agreements. All of the 
reviewed documents were found using search engines, with the keywords “fiscal 
regime”, “fiscal system”, “natural resource”, “benefit agreement”, “revenue sharing”, 
“community”, “resource taxation”, “rent”, “extractive industries”, and “mining” in various 
combinations. Additionally, the reference lists of all reviewed documents were consulted 
to identify related literature. 
3.3. Bonuses 
Bonuses are single, or sometimes staged, lump sum payments which are 
triggered by specified events over a resource project’s life cycle. There is a variety of 
payment triggers for bonuses. Cash bonuses are sometimes paid after negotiations end 
and development contracts are signed (known as signature bonuses). Bonus payments 
can be due periodically over the lifetime of a project (for example every year or every 
quarter), or bonuses may be triggered by the start of production and/or when specified 
                                                 
1 See Table 16 
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production milestones are reached. The specific bonus triggering events, payment rates, 
and longevity of payments depends on legislation or negotiation outcomes. 
Regardless of the triggering event, bonus payments are based on ex ante, or 
forecasted, project profits rather than ex post, or actual, profits. Consequently, bonus 
payments are economically regressive in nature – where the proportion of government 





Bonuses do not require cost control or accounting measures 
and are therefore simple to administer.  
Provides predictable 
and possibly stable 
income to the 
community  
Bonus payments are determined during the negotiation 
phase, and therefore the magnitude and scheduling of 
payments are known to the IBA signatory and private 
investor prior to production. Annual bonus payments provide 
stable income to communities.  
Disadvantages 
Characteristic Description 
Not neutral  Bonus payments are based on ex ante, or forecasted, 
project profits rather than ex post, or actual, profits. They 
therefore do not reflect project profitability and can be 
viewed as additions to costs of a project. Heavy bonus 
payments in the beginning stages of a resource project have 
the potential to make the project uneconomical.  
Relatively low revenue 
generating potential 
Bonus payments are not neutral and reduce the amount of 
rent generated by a given resource project. As a result, the 
amount of rent available for a community to capture is 
reduced. It is also unlikely that the sum of bonus payments 
made to a community equals 100% of the rent generated by 
the project. And so, the community foregoes the possibility 
of collecting maximum revenues from the project.  
Low level of 
community 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Bonus payments, in singularity, do not increase the level of 
community involvement in project decision-making.  
Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Bonuses 
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3.4. Cash Bonus Bidding 
Cash bonus bidding occurs through an auction-like process, during which the 
rights to exploit a given resource are auctioned to the highest bidder. Although 
competitive bidding systems can include bid variables other than bonus payments, such 
as conditional taxes, this literature review mainly discusses cash bidding auctions 
without other bid variables. Firms within the auction bid an amount up to the NPV of the 
resource site (Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; T. Gunton & Richards, 1987). Since the 
NPV of the resource site is an ex ante calculation of resource rents, efficient firms that 
expect higher revenue and/or lower costs will have a higher NPV and therefore outbid 
less efficient firms who expect lower net benefits.  
In theory, competitive bidding captures all resource rents, is administratively 
simple, and does not distort development or operating decisions (Fiscal Affairs 
Department, 2012; Garnaut, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; T. Gunton & 
Richards, 1987). In a competitive auction, firms may pay an amount equal to the NPV of 
the resource site; therefore, bidding may effectively capture expected rent. However, in 
some instances, bonus bids may not reach the NPV of the resource (see, for example, 
Plourde, 2010, for Alberta’s experience with cash bonus bidding and oil sands projects). 
Since the firms estimate their own projected future costs and revenues, the 
governmental entity does not need to employ cost control methods, and so the fiscal tool 
is simple to administer. Additionally, payments are front-end loaded and neutral, thereby 
not affecting development or operating decisions.  
To be successful, competitive bidding requires reliable information on the nature 
of the resource, that a significant number of qualified bidders participate in the auction, 
collusion between bidders is averted, public policy is stable, and that licence terms, as 
well as royalty and tax obligations are transparent (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; T. 
Gunton & Richards, 1987; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014). If only a small 
number of bidders are within the auction, or there is collusion between bidders, the 
highest bid will be undervalued, and governmental receipts will not be maximised. 
Likewise, bids may lose value with unstable public policy or unclear terms, as risk to the 
investor is increased and their NPV of the resource decreased (reflecting the increased 
risk).  
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Auctions only maximise value when there is significant knowledge about the 
resource base, therefore governments may benefit from acquiring exploration data itself 
(Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; Tordo et al., 2010). In most cases, companies will not 
invest in exploration activities without the security of promised extraction rights, in the 
event of proven resources; doing so would place too much risk on the private investor. 
When governments self-acquire exploration data, the uncertainty, and therefore risk, 
inherent in resource exploration is minimised for the private investor. Minimising risk for 
private investors increases their forecasted NPV of the resource and therefore increases 
the magnitude of the highest bid. In comparison to the oil and gas industry, the mining 
industry generally has more knowledge gaps about a given resource base. As a 
consequence of this uncertainty in the mining sector, cash bonus bidding is more often 
used in the oil and gas sector (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012). 
Advantages 
Characteristic Description 
Maximises the revenue 
generating potential of a 
project 
A well-planned bonus bidding auction maximises the 
revenue raising potential of a project, as it efficiently 
captures the ex ante resource rents of a project.   
Administratively efficient Bonuses do not require cost control or accounting 
measures. Moreover, private firms, in the auction, estimate 
their own projected future costs and revenues. The 
administrative burden imposed on IBA signatories when 
cash bonus bidding is used is very low.  
Neutral  Cash bonus bidding results in the capture of economic rent 
to be generated by a resource development. As such, cash 




Unstable revenue The Payment from cash bonus bidding occurs only once. 
As such, the revenue provided to the host government is 
not stable.  
Low level of community 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Cash bonus bidding, without the addition of other bid 
variables, does not increase the level of governmental 
involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Cash Bonus Bidding 
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3.5. Royalties 
Resource royalties are some of the most common fiscal tools used to share 
resource revenues with traditional resource owners (Guj et al., 2013; T. Gunton & 
Richards, 1987). Generally, royalties are the vehicle through which private 
investors/companies compensate resource owners for the loss of their non-renewable 
resource. Royalty payments can be output-based (production or value-based) or profit-
based. 
Production- and value-based royalties (known as volumetric and ad valorem 
royalties respectively) are taken from gross revenues. As a result, they are economically 
regressive and not neutral; yet, they are generally administratively simple, and guarantee 
that the governmental entity receives revenue in the early stages of production (Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 2012; Guj et al., 2013; Johnston, 1994; Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 2014). Neither production- or value-based royalty rates vary with 
project costs and therefore they do not reflect the profitability of a project. Instead, these 
royalties are essentially an addition to project costs and are highly regressive. The 
regressive and non-neutral nature of these payments can cause distortions to 
investment and production decisions. These royalty systems reduce the quantity of rent 
generated by a resource project and thus reduce the sum of revenue that can be 
received by the governmental entity. To increase the overall governmental take, 
refinements are needed to make these royalties responsive to profitability (for example, 
sliding-scales). Volumetric and ad valorem royalties do not require the detailed 
calculation and auditing of costs. Consequently, they are relatively administratively 
simple. However, some royalty systems allow a netback of processing and transportation 
costs, therefore increasing the administrative burden. Different royalty types may bring 
significantly different levels of administrative complexity. Since volumetric and ad 
valorem royalties are not profit-based, they ensure that revenue flows to the 
governmental entity when production starts.  
Profit-based royalties are more economically efficient but are administratively 
complex (Guj, 2012; United Nations Conference on Trade Development, 1995). Further 
discussion about these royalties can be found below.  
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3.5.1. Specific Rate/Volumetric Royalties 
When volumetric royalties are implemented, a fixed monetary amount is charged 
per physical unit of the resource produced and sold. Specifically, the royalty is levied on 
a measure of the volume or weight of the produced resource. For example, a volumetric 
royalty may stipulate that an extractive company must pay, to the governmental entity, a 
specified amount of dollars per tonne, dollars per barrel, or dollars per cubic metre. 
Volumetric royalties are always taken from gross revenues. 
For enforcement and accuracy of payments, volumetric royalties require that the 
volume or weight of the resource produced and sold is audited by the governmental 
entity. Auditing is necessary to validate the amount of actual production, on which the 
fixed rate is levied. For auditing purposes, there are two possible paths through which an 
extracted resource can be sold. Either the extracted resource is sold in an at-arm’s-
length transaction to a third party, or the extracted resource is used by the extractive 
company or a related company (Guj et al., 2013). If the resource is sold in an at-arm’s-
length transaction to a third party, the measure of production, on which the royalty rate is 
applied, can be found in sale invoices. When the extracted resource is not sold at-arm’s-
length, and sales invoices are unavailable, company shipment records may be used. 
Regardless of whether sale invoices or company shipment records can be readily found 
and used, the governmental entity must still carry-out physical audits to ensure that all 
sales are being recorded and reported by the extractive company. The frequency of 
physical audits required is usually less when the resources extracted are sold in an at-
arm’s-length transaction to a third party (See Figure 2. for the volumetric royalty 
verification processes recreated from Guj et al. (2013)) .   
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Figure 2. Volumetric royalty verification process, recreated from Guj et al. 
(2013). 
As suggested by Guj et al. (2013), volumetric royalties are best suited for and 
usually applied to bulk, low-value commodities. Volumetric royalties are highly 
economically inefficient (not neutral) since they are charged on gross production, do not 
reflect project profitability, and essentially raise the cut-off grade (therefore distorting 
project investment and production behaviours); however, volumetric royalties are very 
administratively efficient. In any fiscal regime, administration costs should be balanced 
against likely revenues. Low-value commodities do not justify the devotion of scarce 
resources to the administration of sophisticated and administratively complex fiscal tools. 
Due to the level of economic inefficiency characteristic of volumetric royalties, their 
application to high-value commodities is not advised. If volumetric royalties were levied 
on high-value commodities, there would be a high level of risk to revenue since a 
significant amount of in-ground resources would become prematurely uneconomic.   
Due to the disconnect between volumetric royalty rates and resource market 
values, royalty regulations for volumetric royalties should indicate the frequency of future 
rate reviews and whether the rate used will be linked to a suitable index. Rates used in 
volumetric royalties are pre-defined and therefore do not reflect the dynamic market 
value of any given resource. Meanwhile, the negotiated royalty rate may also be eroded 
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by inflation. To make these rates more flexible, royalty regulations should include rules 






Although auditing processes are needed for volumetric 
royalties, detailed financial auditing and cost accounting 
procedures do not need to be employed by governmental 
entities. Overall, volumetric royalties are easy to administer 
and are one the most administratively efficient royalty and 
tax options. 
Relatively stable 
revenue to the 
community 
Payments to the IBA signatory depend on project 
production. Since project production is relatively stable, 






Volumetric royalties are levied on gross production and 
therefore increase the cut-off grade of an extracted 
resource. As such, the NPV of the resource is lowered using 
these royalties. Moreover, volumetric royalties, alone, do not 
fully capture resource rents.  
Not neutral Volumetric royalties are taken from gross revenue which can 
distort investment and extraction decisions. 
Low level of 
community 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Volumetric royalties do not increase the level of 
governmental involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Volumetric Royalties 
3.5.2. Value-Based/Ad Valorem Royalties 
With an ad valorem royalty, a percentage rate is applied to the value of the 
mineral(s) or other resource products sold by the extractive company. These value-
based royalties are taken from gross revenues and provide income to the governmental 
entity as long as the mine is producing. To compensate for the economic distortions 
caused by ad valorem royalties, rates are relatively low, typically ranging between 2% 
and 10%, with developing countries commonly using rates between 2.5% and 5% 
(Johnston, 1994). Theoretically, the value base (or price), on which the percentage rate 
is applied, should fairly reflect the value of the mineral as it leaves the mine. This 
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maximises the economic efficiency or neutrality of the royalty, as the levied rate will not 
cut into the costs incurred during downstream processing of the mineral (Fiscal Affairs 
Department, 2012; Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 2013).  
Since mineral sales rarely take place at the mine-head, it is necessary to come 
up with a valuation method for the extracted mineral. The royalty base used can vary 
from the gross sale value of the mineral, without any cost deductions, to a value 
obtained by netting back all processing and transportation costs incurred downstream of 
the mine site. If a netback valuation method is used, different valuation points can be 
reached by allowing certain deductions. Allowable deductions may include:  
• Smelting and refining costs  
• Sea freight  
• Insurance 
• Charter liability insurance 
• Umpire assays 
• Unloading supervision at port of discharge  
• Demurrage/despatch at port of discharge  
• Packaging costs  
• Other items that may be approved by the collecting authority  
Alternatively, if an acceptable invoice or contestable market is unavailable for the 
mineral, an accurate grade for the resource must be documented and then referenced to 
available market information.  
In their report, Guj et al. (2013) describe several valuation points which can be 
used for various metals (Tables 5-6). For bulk and base metals, valuation point 3, in 
tables 5 and 6, is recommended. For gold, however, valuation point 2, in table 7, is 
recommended since domestic transportation costs for gold are relatively low (as a 




Sold CIF The purchaser takes actual delivery of 
the goods when the goods cross the 
ship’s rail in the port of destination—
generally an overseas port. 
CIF (cost, insurance and freight) is a 
contract of sale whereby the seller pays 
the cost of transport of the goods to the 
destination. The goods are insured, and 
legal delivery occurs. 
Valuation 
Point 2 
Deduct ship freight costs, 
insurance, and any legal 
costs. 
Free on board (FOB) value is the value of 




Deduct ship-loading cost, 
demurrage and any post-
mine legal fees, and 
insurance and domestic 
transport costs to port.  
Mine-site/gate value 
Table 5. Royalty values at various valuation points for crushed and screened 
bulk ore (e.g., iron ore and manganese) sold to an export market 




Gross sale value of refined metal. The value of the contained 
metals based on assay 




Add credits for other metals. Deduct 
refinery and smelting costs, penalties for 
impurities, non-domestic transport costs, 
insurance, and any legal costs. 
Generally known in 
commercial sector as “net 




Deduct local transport and security and 
market costs. 
Net smelter return (NSR) at 
the mine site/gate. 
Table 6. Royalty values for base metals (e.g., zinc, copper, and lead) at 





Gross sale value of refined 
metal. 
The value of the gold and any other 
precious group metals sold, based on 




Deduct refining costs, non-
domestic transport costs, 
insurance, and any legal 
costs. 
Market value when unrefined metal 
leaves the country. 
Valuation 
Point 3 
Deduct local transport and 
security and marketing costs. 
Mine-site/gate value 
Table 7. Royalty values for gold at various valuation points (Guj et al., 2013). 
The further downstream the valuation point is placed, the lower the royalty rate 
should be. If this is not the case, the royalty will be unfavourable to the extractive 
company and will disincentivize investments in downstream processing. 
Although neutrality increases as the valuation point approaches the mine-head 
value, administrative efficiency decreases. Netback systems include the deduction of a 
range of project operating and capital costs which can complicate the administration of 
the royalty. Essentially, sophisticated valuation methods are more economically efficient 
or neutral but are also more of an administrative burden. As such, the valuation method 








The level of administrative burden imposed on the host 
government is dependent on the valuation point and 
valuation method used. However, since ad valorem royalties 
usually do not require the detailed financial auditing and cost 
accounting procedures necessary when calculating project 
profitability, the overall administrative burden is low – 
bearable.  
Relatively stable 
revenue to the 
community 
Payments to the community depend on project sales or the 
value of the produced resource. Since project production is 
relatively stable, ad valorem royalty receipts are also 






Ad valorem royalties are levied on gross production and 
therefore increase the cut-off grade of an extracted resource. 
As such, the NPV of the resource is lowered using these 
royalties. Moreover, ad valorem royalties, alone, do not fully 
capture resource rent.  
Not neutral Ad valorem royalties are taken from gross revenue which 
can distort investment and extraction decisions. 
Low level of 
governmental 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Ad valorem royalties do not increase the level of 
governmental involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 8. Advantages and Disadvantages of Ad Valorem Royalties 
3.5.3. Profit-Based Royalties 
One of the rarer form of royalties is the profit-based royalty. A profit-based royalty 
highly resembles a corporate income tax but has a few differentiating factors. With a 
profit-based royalty, a pre-defined or negotiated percentage rate is applied to a measure 
of net income or profit. Profit-based royalties differentiate from corporate income taxes in 
a few areas. Firstly, they are mainly used by sub-national tiers of government, and unlike 
a corporate income tax, profit-based royalties are levied at the project level rather than 
the corporate entity level. In comparison to the deductions allowed under corporate 
income taxes, profit-based royalties have capital recovery rules which are setup to 
promote revenue flows to government earlier in the project lifecycle, incorporate 
methods to bring the measure of profit closer to that generated by the value of the 
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resource (for example via a netback system), and sometimes substitute the deductibility 





Profit-based royalties reflect project profitability and are 
almost fully neutral fiscal tools. As such, the NPV and rent of 
the resource is maximised, and so is the potential community 
take.  
Almost fully neutral  The royalty is based on project profitability and is therefore 
almost fully neutral. Profit-based royalties, however, do 
capture some quasi-rents which are needed to incentivise 
future investments; therefore profit-based royalties are not 





Profit-based royalties are administratively inefficient because 
they require unique deductions on gross revenue, and 
measurements of project costs to determine profit. These 
calculations and measurements require a certain set of 
financial skills and therefore the administrative burden 
imposed by profit-based royalties is high.  
Unstable revenue 
flows to the 
community 
This is levied on project profits, which can be variable over 
time due to market conditions, project costs, and/or 
production levels. Consequently, revenue flows to the 
government may be highly variable. 
Low level of 
government 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Profit-based royalties do not increase the level of 
governmental involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 9. Advantages and Disadvantages of Profit-Based Royalties 
3.6. Taxes 
3.6.1. Property Tax 
Governmental entities can capture a portion of resource revenues through 
property taxes. Property taxes are usually applied as a percentage of a site’s value. The 
value of a site can be determined using either the NPV of the mineral reserve, the book 
value or depreciated book value of capital expenditures, or the market value of 




Administratively efficient   Complex calculations, cost control and accounting 
processes are not needed. Property taxes impose a 
very low administrative burden on a host government.  
Stable revenue to the 
community 
Payments to the host government depend on a site’s 
value. Since payments do not depend on a variable 





Property taxes fail to capture sizeable resource 
revenues and are additions to project costs (non-
reflective of project profitability).   
Not neutral Property tax is considered an addition to costs since it 
is not dependent on project profitability. This causes 
distortions to production and investment decisions. 
Low level of governmental 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Property taxes do not increase the level of 
governmental involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 10. Advantages and Disadvantages of Property Taxes 
3.6.2. Lease Fee 
Lease fees can be used by host governments to obtain relatively small but 
consistent revenues from holders of public resource rights. While private leaseholders 
are required to maintain a minimum level of activity to maintain their lease, lease fee 
payments depend on the size of the land leased. The private leaseholder will annually 





Administratively efficient  Complex calculations, cost control and accounting 
processes are not needed. Lease fees impose a very 
low administrative burden on a host government.  
Stable revenue to the 
community 
Payments to the host government depend on a site’s 
size. Since payments do not depend on a variable 





Lease fees fail to capture sizeable resource revenues 
and are additions to project costs (non-reflective of 
project profitability).   
Not neutral A lease fee is considered an addition to costs since it 
is not dependent on project profitability. This causes 
distortions to production and investment decisions. 
Low level of governmental 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Lease fees do not increase the level of governmental 
involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 11. Advantages and Disadvantages of Lease Fees 
3.6.3. Economic Rent-Based Tax 
Economic rent-based taxes are fully neutral fiscal tools which are most commonly 
used in the oil and gas sector (Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 
2013; T. Gunton & Richards, 1987).  With an economic rent-based tax, a specified 
percentage rate is applied to a measure of economic rent. As previously stated, 
economic rent is defined as the revenue surplus derived after deducting all costs of 
production from gross revenue, including a pre-defined “normal” rate of return. In theory, 
this “normal” rate of return should represent a minimum rate to encourage investment in 
a project. Since capital and recurrent operating costs are deducted from revenue when 
incurred, tax-collecting entities may receive no revenue for a number of years, until the 
company has recovered their initial financial investment plus the pre-defined rate of 
return. As such, economic rent-based taxes may not provide revenues to the host 
government in the earlier years of production.  
The determined rate of return, used in these rent-based taxes, is implemented as 
an annual uplift and is generally expressed as the long-term bond rate (LTBR) plus a risk 
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premium (Guj et al., 2013; Johnston, 1994). Uplifts allow the private company to recover 
an additional percentage of capital costs through cost recovery. For example, an uplift of 
20% on capital expenditures of $100 million would allow the contractor to recover $120 
million. Since the entitlement to financial rewards is proportional to the level of risk taken, 
risk premiums are added to the LTBR when the tax-receiving governmental entity does 
not share in the ultimate risk of the resource project.  
Like ad valorem royalties, the administration of rent-based taxes becomes more 
complex when a taxing point closer to the point of extraction is used. If a taxing point 
closer to the point of extraction is used, the host government can net back costs from the 
point of sale to the taxing point. Doing this will give the gross revenue from which 
allowable costs are deducted.  
At the taxing point, allowable costs are deducted. A positive value denotes the 
level of profit, on which the rent-based tax is levied. However, a resulting negative value, 
for any given year, indicates that expenditures have exceeded revenues. Consequently, 
the negative cash flows are carried forward to the next year and are uplifted at the 
specified rate of return. These losses are then used to offset project profits in the new 







potential of a project 
Rent-based taxes capture no more or less than the economic 
rent generated by a resource development project. As such, 
the NPV and rent of the resource is maximised, and so is the 
potential government take.  
Neutral  This tax is completely rent-based and is therefore fully 
neutral. Properly formulated economic-rent based taxes are 





Rent-based taxes require more detailed financial data than 
any other royalty or tax system. Additionally, practical 
implementation can be complex, as a “normal”, risk-adjusted 
rate of return needs to be calculated, and the enforcement, 
administration and auditing of these taxes is likely to be 
complex. The administrative burden imposed on the host 
government is high.    
Unstable revenue to 
the community 
This tax is levied on economic rent and therefore the 
magnitude of tax receipts depends on commodity prices and 
exchange rates, as well as the costs allowed to be deducted 
from gross revenues. Consequently, revenue flows to the 
government may be highly variable. 
Low level of 
government 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
Economic rent-based taxes do not increase the level of 
governmental involvement in project decision-making. 
Table 12. Advantages and Disadvantages of Economic Rent-Based Taxes 
3.7. Hybrid Regimes 
Hybrid regimes are royalty or tax systems which combine numerous fiscal tools 
into one system. Therefore, hybrid systems can be broken up into individual fiscal tools. 
Hybrid regimes are implemented to achieve and balance a set of desired governmental 
objectives.  
Hybrid systems often try to balance neutrality, revenue generation and revenue 
stability by combining a profit- or rent-based royalty or tax with a volumetric or ad 
valorem royalty. Economic neutrality and revenue generation increase by the inclusion of 
a profit- or rent-based component. The inclusion of a volumetric or ad valorem fiscal 
component ensures that the community will receive a minimal amount of consistent 
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revenue throughout the project’s production phase. These output-based royalties 
eliminate risks to economic certainty faced by communities, where there is a possibility 
that the community may collect no revenue if, in any given year, there is no taxable profit 
or rent (Guj et al., 2013). 
Although hybrid systems can offer the benefits of the individual fiscal tools 
involved, they also introduce some disadvantages associated with each tool. Hybrid 
systems with profit- or rent-based royalties/taxes make the system more administratively 
inefficient and add some revenue instability (since only a minimal unit-based or ad 
valorem component will be accepted by industry to work in collaboration with profit- or 
rent-based components). The use of a volumetric or ad valorem component makes the 
system less economically neutral and reduces the amount of revenue that can be 
received by government in the case of windfall profits. Additionally, the inclusion of an 
output-based royalty component will lower the NPV of the resource site, as the cut-off 
grade is increased, and production may prematurely become uneconomic (Guj, 2012; 




The main advantages of the hybrid system depend on the 




The main disadvantages of the hybrid system depend on the 
individual fiscal components which make up the system. However, 
hybrid systems generally are less administratively efficient since 
they consist of multiple fiscal components. The combination of 
fiscal tools often leads to the administration of the overall system 
by different agencies, since one agency alone may lack the 
capacity to administer all a hybrid system’s components.   
Table 13. Advantages and Disadvantages of Hybrid Regimes 
3.8. Production-Sharing Contracts  
Production-sharing contracts (PSCs) are a type of contractual system in which 
the extractive company or private investor takes the role of a contractor for the 
governmental entity. Although these contractual systems are more commonly used in 
the oil and gas industry, they are sometimes employed in the mining industry (Guj, 
2012). Within a PSC, the extractive company provides the technical and financial 
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services for resource exploration and development. Consequently, the extractive 
company bares the technical and financial risks of the project. As compensation for the 
risks taken and services rendered by the extractive company, the company receives a 
share of the resource produced, while the governmental entity receives the balance. For 
PSCs, it is important to note that the resource or physical product is the medium of 
compensation to the contractor, and not cash (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012; 
Johnston, 1994).   
Although PSCs inherently split production between extractive companies and 
host governments, resource royalties are sometimes used in conjunction. In the rarer 
instances where royalties are in place within a PSC, royalty rates may range as high as 
15% (Johnston, 1994). In instances where royalties are not in place, the level of 
government take should compensate for the lack of resource royalties. 
However, extractive companies may be entitled to recover some, or all, of the 
costs of exploration and development; therefore, cost control and accounting procedures 
are often necessary. When cost recovery is allowed, extractive companies deduct 
allowable costs from gross production. While most PSCs have cost recovery ceilings, 
ranging between 30% and 60% of costs incurred, some PSCs have no cost recovery 
ceilings. Other PSCs do not allow cost recovery at all (Johnston, 1994). In systems 
where cost recovery is allowed, when operating costs as well as depreciation, depletion 
and amortization (DD&A) amount to more than the pre-determined cost recovery limit, 
the balance is often carried forward and recovered later. In some cases, if the 
contractor’s claimed costs are less than the cost recovery ceiling, the difference, or 
excess produce, goes directly to the governmental entity. No matter the case, cost 
recovery programs require the governmental entity to audit claimed costs. These 
necessary cost control and accounting procedures add to the administrative load and 
can be a burden to host governments if they lack the capacity to effectively monitor and 
audit capital and recurrent costs. 
After royalties and costs are deducted from gross production, the remaining profit 
resource is shared between the extractive company and the host government. Profit 
resources can be split between the two entities in several ways. The first option is to split 
profit production using a fixed rate or percentage. For example, in a fixed 60%/40% split, 
in favour of the governmental entity, profit production is shared between the contractor 
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and governmental entity at the defined rate. The contractor is therefore entitled to 40% 
of the profit resource, while the government collects 60% of the profit resource. 
Alternatively, profit production can be split between a contractor and a governmental 
entity on a sliding-scale basis. Specifically, sliding-scale splits for PSCs are usually 
based on either the daily rate of production (DROP), cumulative production from the 
project, an R factor, or a rate of return (ROR) system (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012).  
To determine the distribution of production within a PSC, a total of four steps 
need to be followed (Figure 3) (Johnston, 1994). First, if royalties are in place, they must 
be deducted from gross production. Secondly, before profit production is calculated and 
split, the contractor may recover costs up to the cost recovery ceiling. Then, profit 
production is calculated and split according to the PSC agreement. Taxes may then be 
taken from the contractor’s share of the profit resource.  
 
Figure 3. Production sharing contract flow diagram (Johnston, 1994). Within 
the PSC represented in this diagram, a 10% volumetric royalty is 
imposed, there is a 40% cost recovery ceiling, a fixed profit split of 
40%/60%, in favour of the governmental entity, and a 40% tax rate. 
Note that cost recovery is calculated using gross production (before 
royalties) rather than net production.  
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These contractual systems specialize in the sharing of physical product rather 
than cash, and therefore the governmental entity can receive its monetary revenue using 
one of two different methods. Either the product is separately marketed, thorough the 
creation of and sale via a government agency, or the producer markets the product on 
the government’s behalf (Guj et al., 2013; T. Gunton & Richards, 1987). 
In PSC systems, the governmental entity is usually involved in project 
management and decision-making processes. Under these contracts, the governmental 
entity remains the owner of the resource and is therefore involved in the decision-making 
processes. The host government is involved in the budgeting and auditing phases of the 
project and may sometimes actively participate in exploration and development 
operations. Often, a PSC will stipulate the formation of a joint management committee 
where both the private investor and governmental entity are represented. This joint 
management committee oversees project operations. However, as a consequence of 
joint management, bureaucratization of the management process may occur (United 
Nations Conference on Trade Development, 1995).  
When establishing a PSC, there are numerous design options to consider. 
Consequently, detailed negotiations between the project investor and governmental 
entity are required. Through a negotiation process, cost recovery options, the form of 
production sharing, method for product marketing, and level of government involvement 
must be determined. If all conditions are not captured in a comprehensive contract 





Can maximise the 
revenue generating 
potential of a project  
Where economic neutrality is maximised, the NPV of the 
resource is also maximised. Since PSCs are capable of 
being mostly or fully neutral, they are also capable of 
maximising the economic rent generated by a resource. 
Consequently, the revenue raising potential of a project is 
also maximised, since the host government is able to extract 
a higher magnitude of economic rent.  
Capable of being 
neutral  
In instances where full cost recovery is allowed, no royalties 
are added, and the split of profit produce is fixed (ie. not on a 
sliding scale), PSCs are almost fully neutral. They do not 
distort exploration and production decisions. However, under 
these circumstances, a PSC essentially acts as a profit-
based tax; it therefore appropriates quasi-rents which are 
needed to incentivise future investments, and full economic 
neutrality is not met. To be fully neutral, a PSC must 
incorporate interest cost recovery features (like within an 
economic rent-based tax).  
Potential for 
community 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
In PSC systems, the governmental entity is usually involved 
in project management and decision-making processes. This 
occurs since the governmental entity remains the owner of 
the resource and the extractive company or private investor 





PSCs often require accounting for and deducting project 
costs as well as auditing these costs. Additionally, 
involvement in complex project management decisions 
further adds to the administrative burden placed on host 
governments under PSCs. Moreover, if the governmental 
entity were to sell their share of the profit produce, marketing 
and sales infrastructure would have to be developed and 
managed.  
Unstable revenue 
flows to the 
community 
Since splits under a PSC depend on project profits, income 
to the host government will vary depending on commodity 
market prices, levels of production, and project costs. Since 
these three determining factors are individually dynamic, 
income to the host government is variable under a PSC.  
Table 14. Advantages and Disadvantages of Production-Sharing Contracts. 
The advantages and disadvantages of PSC systems are not uniform. 
Instead, they depend on the specific terms of any given PSC.  
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3.9. Service Contracts  
Due to the rarity of pure, or non-risk service contracts, this section will only 
describe risk service contracts. While pure service contracts exist, their use is very rare 
since all risk is placed on the governmental entity (Johnston, 1994).  
Like PSCs, service contracts are most common in the oil and gas industry, and 
stipulate that the private investor takes on the roll of contractor. In service contracts, the 
natural resource firm, or private investor, provides the technical, financial, and 
commercial services required for resource exploration and development. In return for 
their services, the governmental entity allows the private investor to recover project costs 
through the sale of the resource. In addition to cost recovery allowances, the 
governmental entity also pays the contractor a fee based on a pre-negotiated 
percentage of the remaining revenue.  
Service contracts only slightly differ from PSCs and therefore the main 
advantages and disadvantages for service contracts are similar to those of PSCs. From 
a legal standpoint, the contractor never owns any of the production under service 
contracts. Unlike PSCs, service contracts stipulate that payments to the governmental 
entity are in cash rather than in kind. Other than these two main points of distinction, the 
two contractual systems are very similar. Profit splitting is conducted in the same manner 
similar and arithmetic/revenue distribution calculations are the same. Because the 
difference between PSCs and service contracts is so minute, the main characteristics as 
well as advantages and disadvantaged of the two systems are very similar. 
For the advantages and disadvantages of service contracts, refer to those under 
production-sharing contracts. 
3.10. Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are a unique type of agreement which stipulate and define how 
revenue is shared between private investors and governmental entities. Specifically, joint 
ventures share resource revenues through government equity participation. The shared 
project equity entitles the governmental entity to receive a share of revenues or 
production and/or dividend payments. Profit production is split according to the equity 
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shares, as defined in the joint venture arrangement (Figure 4). Although joint ventures 
appear to be a type of fiscal system, they are not since they can be implemented within 
either a concessionary or PSC system (as seen in Figure 4) (Johnston, 1994).  
 
Figure 4. The distribution of project revenues under a PSC system with a joint 
venture and royalty included (Johnston, 1994). The joint venture in 
this example stipulates a 70%/30% equity split in favour of the 
private contractor. Meanwhile, the PSC stipulates a 60%/40% profit 
oil split, in favour of the private contractor. After royalties and costs 
are deducted from gross revenue, the remaining profit oil is split 
according to the PSC. The remaining profit oil is then split again 
according to the joint venture. As such, in this example, the joint 
venture acts as another layer of taxation. Then, once taxes are 
deducted from the remaining balance, post the joint venture split, 
the remaining profit oil goes to the private oil company.   
While the revenue distributing arithmetic remains the same, there are two 
possible types of joint ventures (United Nations Conference on Trade Development, 
1995). The first type is an equity joint venture. In an equity joint venture, a joint stock 
company is established in which each partner owns a certain percentage of equity. 
Alternatively, there are contractual joint ventures. Within a contractual joint venture, the 
partnership is not constituted to a joint stock company and therefore assumes no 
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separate corporate identity. Instead, the relationship is governed by an agreement under 
which each partner owns an undivided share of production  
In joint ventures, governmental involvement is extended beyond the budget and 
auditing phase to include the implementation phase of resource development (United 
Nations Conference on Trade Development, 1995). The equity-sharing component of 
joint ventures allows for the governmental entity to actively participate in decision-making 
and management processes. In fact, sometimes joint ventures are used to ensure that 
governments get a “seat at the table” or to facilitate the transfer of knowledge.  Since 
joint ventures require cost control, accounting, auditing procedures, and management 
decisions from the governmental partner, they have a high admirative burden. 
Additionally, like under PSCs and service contracts, joint management within joint 
ventures can lead to a bureaucratization of management processes, and further reduce 
administrative efficiency.  
The governmental entity has a few different options to obtain project equity 
(Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012). The first option is to obtain fully paid-up equity, where 
the governmental entity pays for shares in the project. Another option is for a carried 
interest arrangement to be made. Under a carried interest arrangement, the private 
resource company finances governmental participation in the project. The costs and 
interest charges incurred by the private company are then offset against future 
government shares from the project. Alternatively, the government may negotiate free 
equity in the project – where the free equity is usually partially offset against other tax 
payments (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2012). 
Each equity-gaining option shifts the proportion of risk placed on the 
governmental entity and private investor respectively. With fully paid-up equity, project 
costs are shared between the private company and the government. As such, fully paid-
up equity equally distributes project risks between the private investor and government. 
In comparison to fully paid-up equity, carried interest arrangements lower the risk to 
government since the private company originally finances governmental participation in 
the project. Opposite to fully paid-up equity, a full carry or free equity arrangement 





Can maximise the 
revenue generating 
potential of a project  
Where economic neutrality is maximised, the NPV of the 
resource is also maximised. Since joint ventures are capable 
of being mostly neutral, they are also capable of maximising 
the economic rent generated by a resource. Consequently, 
the revenue raising potential of a project is also maximised, 
since the host government can extract a higher magnitude of 
economic rent.  
Capable of being 
neutral  
In instances where the host government gains fully paid-up 
equity, or gains equity through a carried interest 
arrangement, joint ventures are fully neutral. They do not 
distort exploration, production or investment decisions. When 
free equity is negotiated, however, the neutrality of the fiscal 
system is reduced.  
Potential for 
government 
involvement in project 
decision-making 
In joint ventures, the host government owns a percentage 
equity of the resource project. Consequently, the 
governmental entity may be involved in project management 





As illustrated in Figure 4, costs must always be deducted 
before revenues are split. Due to the cost control, 
accounting, and auditing procedures necessary within joint 
ventures, administrative efficiency is reduced. Moreover, 
joint management of the project may further reduce the 
administrative efficiency of the system.  
Unstable revenue 
flows to the community 
Since splits within a joint venture depend on project profits, 
income to the host government will vary depending on 
commodity market prices, levels of production, and project 
costs. Since these three determining factors are individually 
dynamic, income to the host government is variable.  
Table 15. Advantages and Disadvantages of Joint Ventures. 
3.11. Qualitative Comparison of Fiscal Tools and Systems to 
Potential Community Objectives 
A comparison matrix was developed to illustrate the relative advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each previously described fiscal instrument and system 
(Table 16). The evaluation criteria used mirrors the potential community objectives 
described in Chapter 2.4. This comparison matrix was adapted from C. Gunton, Batson, 
Gunton, Markey, & Dale, 2020. 
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Service contracts           
Joint venture 
          
Bonuses/Fixed 
payments 
          
Cash bonus 
bidding 
          
Volumetric royalty 
          
Ad valorem royalty 
          
Profit-based 
royalty  
          
Property tax 
          
Lease fee 
          
Economic rent-
based tax  




royalty, and rate)           
Performance:   Good   Satisfactory   Poor 
Table 16. Qualitative comparison matrix of fiscal instruments and systems 
used in revenue-sharing agreements. 
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Chapter 4. An Evaluation of Fiscal Regimes 
Negotiated in the Base Metal Mining Sector 
4.1. Introduction  
IBAs have become a popular tool used to address social, environmental and 
economic issues stemming from resource development; however, there is considerable 
debate about how effective they have been in achieving their objectives 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; O’Faircheallaigh & Gibson, 2012). Consequently, an important 
research priority is the evaluation of IBAs to assess their effectiveness and identify best 
practice guidelines for negotiating them. This chapter addresses this research need by 
focusing on one of the key components of IBAs: the provisions for revenue generation 
for impacted communities. This chapter focuses on quantitatively evaluating the revenue 
generating capacity and revenue stability provided through IBAs in the base metal 
mining sector. The chapter begins by describing the concept of economic rent – a 
concept that can be used as a reference standard for assessing the effectiveness of 
revenue generating measures. This is followed by a description of the methodology and 
discussion of the findings and implications for IBAs. 
Natural resource projects can generate sizeable economic rents, or surplus 
revenue in excess of all costs of production including a normal return on capital (Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 2012; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Guj, 2012; Guj et al., 2013; T. 
Gunton & Richards, 1987; Johnston, 1994). The magnitude of economic rent generated 
by a resource development project is dependent on the type and grade of the mineral 
deposit, commodity sales prices, and production costs. The rent reflects the market 
value of the in-situ resource and because it is estimated after covering all costs including 
a return to capital, it is theoretically possible for communities to collect the rent while still 
preserving the economic viability of the project. Consequently, measuring the proportion 
of rent accruing to the community is a good metric for evaluating the effectiveness of IBA 
revenue-sharing stipulations. 
Payments to resource-owners for the rights to extract natural resources are 
collected by what can be termed fiscal regimes. A fiscal regime is the set of fiscal 
instruments that are designed to collect revenue from resource extraction for the owner 
of the natural resource (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015). In theory, fiscal 
38 
regimes should collect the rent, or economic value of the in-situ resource deposit (Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 2012; Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983).  
However, the design of a fiscal regime to collect rent is challenging and should 
take into account multiple objectives such as revenue generating potential, 
administrative complexity, economic neutrality, stability of revenue flows over time, and 
responsiveness to windfall profits. If the fiscal regime is poorly designed, it can create 
market distortions and sub-optimal results such as high grading of the resource and/or 
failure to pay the owner adequate compensation for the resource rights (T. Gunton, 
2003). A well-designed fiscal regime on the other hand can generate a stable flow of 
revenue for natural resource owners and ensure that they collect the economic value of 
their natural resource, while ensuring efficient resource extraction. 
4.2. Evaluation Methods 
The first step in the evaluation of IBA fiscal regime provisions was to collect data 
on revenue-collecting measures in existing IBAs within the natural resource sector. A 
database of fiscal regimes and tools used in IBAs was created based on a literature 
review using existing inventories such as the Columbia Centre for Sustainable 
Investment’s (CCSI) Community Development Agreement Database, various 
government websites and a literature review of IBAs based on key word searches on 
Google Scholar and Google. A total of 78 agreements from numerous countries, 
including Australia, Canada, Ghana, Greenland, Laos, Mongolia, and Papua New 
Guinea were identified for review (database available at: 
http://www.sfu.ca/rem/planning/research/IBA/Database.html). A subset of the 78 
agreements was chosen for a detailed evaluation of their respective fiscal regimes. The 
agreements selected within this subset are those for mining projects for which there is 
sufficient publicly available detail on the fiscal regimes to allow for evaluation. The 
mining sector was chosen for evaluation because there are a number of publicly 
available IBAs in the mining sector. The evaluation needs to be restricted to a specific 
sector due to the significant differences between resource sector economics that impact 
the evaluation method. 
Based on these criteria, ten IBAs were selected for detailed evaluation (Table 
17). The fiscal regimes employed in these IBAs use four types of fiscal instruments: a 
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fixed payment royalty system, in which the community receives a predetermined fixed 
payment at various points during the project’s development and operation, a profit-based 
royalty that collects a percentage of mining net revenue, an ad valorem royalty that 
collects a percentage of project revenue, and a joint venture, in which a percentage of 
project equity is held by the community. One of the fiscal regimes uses only fixed 
payments, five regimes take a percentage of senior governments’ mining royalty 
revenue, which is generated by a profit-based royalty system, one regime uses fixed 
payments and a profit-based royalty, and the remaining three regimes use a combination 
of fixed payments and an ad valorem royalty (with one of these three regimes also 
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for the first 2 
years of 
agreement.  
                                                 
2 The Mary River Project Benefit Agreement includes a number of advanced payments. It was assumed that 
the signing bonus, along with the payments triggered by water license receival and construction approval, 
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percentage is a 
proportion of B.C. 
Mineral Tax 
Revenue. 
                                                 
3 British Columbia’s (B.C.) mineral tax is a two-part tax, imposed on a mine-by-mine bases. The two 
components of this tax are:  a 2% net current proceeds tax, and a 13% net revenue tax. Here, net current 
proceeds is defined as, the amount by which the operator’s gross revenue and proceeds from government 
grants and subsidies, for the mine’s operation, exceeds the current operating costs (excluding capital costs); 
whereas net revenue is defined as, the amount by which net current proceeds exceeds the sum of: capital 
costs (net of any proceeds from the disposition of capital assets in the year); exploration costs; pre-production 
and development costs; an annual “investment allowance”; and the “new mine allowance” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). The net current proceeds tax is a form of minimum tax which is fully 
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Gold, copper Ad valorem 
royalty5 
1.4% Yearly. Rate 
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Paid during mine 
construction. 
                                                 
4 Using public information from the Bank of Canada, and search dates from January 2, 2017 – December 29, 
2017, an average conversion rate from USD to CAD was calculated. The conversion rate used was therefore 
1.30. 
5 The Kainantu Gold Mine and Ramu Nickel Cobalt Project are located in Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Therefore, revenue is shared to impacted communities by the State of PNG. The indicated ad valorem rates, 
for both agreements, has been converted to reflect the proportion of mineral value which flows to the impacted 
communities. Originally, these values were expressed as a proportion of the ad valorem royalty which the 
State of Papua New Guinea collects from a base metal project – stipulated within Papua New Guinea’s Mining 
Act, 1992. Based on PNG’s Mining Act 1992, it is assumed that the State collects a 2% FOB ad valorem 
royalty for base metals. 
6 When converting Papua New Guinea Kina to CAD, a ninety-day conversion rate average was calculated 
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Tier 1: 4.5% 
Tier 2: 39% 
Lump sums are 
deductible from 
the income-based 
royalty. Like the 
B.C. mineral tax, 
Tier 1 is levied on 
a calculation of 
Net Current 
Proceeds, while 
Tier 2 is levied on 
a measure of Net 
Revenue.  
Table 17. Description of the analysed fiscal regimes and their respective 
mining projects. All agreements have been made available at: 
http://www.sfu.ca/rem/planning/research/IBA/Database.html 
The next step in the evaluation was to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of 
each fiscal regime in generating revenue and collecting resource rents for the community 
signing the IBA, and in providing the community with stable payments over time. To 
quantify the rent collecting and revenue generating abilities of each fiscal regime, a 
measurement of percent rent captured by a community was used. The percent rent 
collected by a community positively correlates to the magnitude of revenue received. 
The measurement of percent rent captured by a community mirrors the calculation for 
the average effective tax rate, as seen below:  
% 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 = (
𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
) × 100%  
; 𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Meanwhile, for each fiscal regime, revenue stability was indicated by the coefficient of 
variation of the community’s annual revenue throughout the project’s production phase. 
Using the coefficient of variation allows for an accurate comparison of income variability 
between alternative fiscal regimes, which produce respectively different means for 
annual community income.  
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (
𝜎
𝜇
) × 100%  
;  𝜎 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝜇 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
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Additionally, the range of a community’s annual income, throughout all project phases, 
was used to further indicate revenue stability. In particular, the maximum and minimum 
annual income was identified for each evaluated fiscal regime.   
Estimating revenue generated by the fiscal regime and resource rents from 
mining projects is challenging because the estimation is based on mines that are 
currently operating and therefore requires forecasting past and future revenue flows. 
Another complication is that each mining operation has different costs and revenues that 
are not possible to estimate based on publicly available information. The only feasible 
method for addressing these challenges in estimating resource revenues was to 
construct a discounted cash flow (DCF) mining model based on a representative mine 
and use the model to estimate the magnitude of resource revenue and proportion of 
resource rent which flows to an impacted community for the ten IBAs being evaluated. 
The modified discounted cash flow mining model used in the evaluation is based on 
publicly available data from an open-pit copper and gold mine recently constructed in 
British Columbia, Canada. Key assumptions for the mine model are summarised in 
Table 18. 
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Beginning of Construction  Year 2 
End of Construction  Year 4 
First Year of Production Year 5 
Last Year of Production Year 29 
Copper Production (lbs/year) 74,636,000 
Gold Production (oz/year) 33,437 
Total Copper Prod’n over Life of Project (lbs) 1,865,900,000 
Total Gold Prod’n over Life of Project (oz) 835,923 
Total Capital Expenditures (millions of 2018 Can $) 637 
Capital Depreciation Rate (%) 25 
Copper per unit operating costs (2018 Can $/lb copper) 2.6 
Treatment/Refining/Transport Cost ($/lb copper) 0.37 
Amortization period on the mine debt (years) 25 
General and Administration costs 1% gross annual sales 
Annual Contribution to Reclamation (millions of 2018 Can $) 5 
Debt financing (%) 60 
Equity Financing (%) 40 
Interest rate (%) 7 
Discount Rate (%)7 10 
Table 18. Hypothetical base metal project: key assumptions. 
                                                 
7 A 10% discount rate was chosen to approximate the discount rate used by private mining 
companies. It is important that the discount rate used to calculate the NPV of revenue to each party 
be identical, as the resulting NPVs are then used to determine rent distribution via the average 
effective tax rate (AETR) formula. The 10% private discount rate is inflated to reflect the inherent 
political, geological, and economic risks of large resource development projects (Fiscal Affairs 
Department, 2012; Luca & Mesa Puyo, 2016; Smith, 2002). 
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The mine model is designed to use different assumptions for cost of production, 
quantity of production, and commodity prices to reflect the potential variation among 
mines and uncertainty regarding future market conditions. A number of assumptions 
were tested, and three scenarios were chosen for presentation to reflect uncertainty and 
potential variation in mining revenues. The scenarios are based on three different 
commodity price assumptions: a reference price, high price, and low price. The 
reference price scenario uses annual year-end prices of gold and copper over ten years 
(2008 to 2017) converted to constant 2018 dollars. The low and high price scenarios are 
estimated based on a +/- 10% variation from the reference price. In all three price 
scenarios, commodity prices vary from year to year, consistent with the market price 
cycles experienced during the previous ten years. Changes in costs and output were 
also tested in the modeling but these changes had similar impacts on revenue and rent 
distribution estimates as the changes in prices, given that changes in all of these 
assumptions impacted net revenue, and net revenue are the principal determinants of 
rent generated by the mine. Therefore, the three price scenarios provide a range of 
estimates that also capture potential variation in mining costs.  
A discount rate of 10% was used to calculate the NPV of the project, which is 
defined as project rent, and the net present value of the revenue streams accruing to the 
various parties. Alternative higher and lower discount rates were also used to test the 
impact on revenue estimates. For ease of presentation, they are not reported in this 
paper, but the results show that the lower the discount rate, the higher the rent estimates 
and the lower the percentage of rent collected by the IBA. 
The coefficient of variation of annual community revenue was used to indicate 
the relative stability of each fiscal regime. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean. Therefore, unlike the standard deviation, the coefficient 
of variation allows for comparisons to be made between data series, even if the mean of 
each series is significantly different. 
Fiscal Regime Assumptions and Boundaries  
When summarising the tax and royalty structures in Table 16, and inputting each 
fiscal regime into the model, several assumptions and boundaries were made. In 
general, it was assumed that:  
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1. payments are made in full and on time, as to not incur any interest 
payments,  
2. decisions are made in a timely manner, and therefore do not trigger any 
additional payments, and 
3. no project suspension occurs. 
Additionally, the tax and royalty structures described and tested do not include payments 
which:  
1. depend on internal budgeting processes or matching contribution,  
2. occur through the provision of non-financial benefits, and/or 
3. come directly from a government entity that is not a signee in the bilateral 
IBA. 
4.3. Results 
Model outputs for the proportion of project rent accruing to the community for the 
different fiscal regimes under the three commodity scenarios are summarised in Figure 
5. The variability in annual payments is also summarised, in Table 19 and Figure 6. 
Here, income variability is indicated by the range of the community’s annual revenue and 
the coefficient of variation of payments received, by the community, throughout the 
project’s life.  
Under low, reference, and high market price scenarios, the ten negotiated fiscal 
regimes capture relatively modest proportions of economic rent for communities. 
Specifically, the percentage of rent collected by the community under the ten evaluated 
fiscal regimes ranges from 1.01% to 52.62% under the low market price scenario, 1.03% 
to 18.79% under the reference market price scenario, and 1.12% to 11.89% under the 
high market price scenario.  
Fiscal regimes 1 and 8 capture the highest proportion of rent, regardless of the 
commodity scenario and will therefore be the main focus for comparative analysis. Under 
the low price scenario, regimes 1 and 8 collect over 50% of economic rent for 
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communities. Under the reference case, they collect 18.6% and 18.8% respectively. 
Finally, under the high price scenario, they collect 11.9% and 11.3% respectively.  Their 
rent-capturing abilities significantly decrease under reference and high market price 
scenarios because a large proportion of the revenue collected is based on fixed 
payments that are insensitive to changes in mining profits resulting from higher prices 
(Figure 5). The fiscal regimes that collect the lowest proportion of rent are those based 
on a percentage of senior government mining royalties, which are calculated as a 
percent of mining profits (3, 4, 5, 6, 7). 
Although fiscal regimes 1 and 8 capture similar proportions of rent for the 
impacted community (Figure 5), fiscal regime 1 generates a higher minimum and 
maximum value of annual community revenue under all commodity market scenarios 
(Table 19). Fiscal regime 1 provides a minimum annual income between $2.65 million 
and $3.24 million Canadian and a maximum annual income of $22.03 million Canadian, 
depending on the commodity market scenario; whereas, fiscal regime 8 provides a 
minimum annual income of $0 Canadian and a maximum annual income of $6.50 million 
Canadian. Regimes 1 and 8 differ in this regard because, unlike fiscal regime 8, fiscal 
regime 1 includes provisions for the community to receive a minimum annual income 
throughout all phases of project development. Additionally, fiscal regime 1 stipulates that 
substantial bonus payments be paid during the project’s pre-production phases.  
Throughout the project’s production phase, fiscal regime 8 provides the most 
stable income to communities (Figure 6). Under all commodity market scenarios, fiscal 
regime 8 has a coefficient of variance equal to 0, indicating that this regime is composed 
only of annual fixed payments which are unresponsive to fluctuations in commodity 
markets and project profits and/or costs.  
In contrast to fiscal regime 8, fiscal regime 1 includes an ad valorem royalty, in 
addition to numerous fixed payments (Table 16). Since annual community revenue 
generated through fiscal regime 1 is influenced by fluctuations in commodity market 
prices, annual community revenue is less stable (Figure 6). The coefficient of variation 
calculated under regime 1 is 14.3%, regardless of commodity market scenario. 
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Figure 5. Proportion of resource rent retained by a community under each 




Table 19. Community range in annual income throughout all project phases, 
for each fiscal regime under low, reference and high market price 
scenarios. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Low 50.89% 15.30% 3.24% 3.03% 1.08% 1.60% 1.01% 52.62% 31.46% 25.28% 46.73%
Reference 18.79% 7.55% 3.32% 3.10% 1.11% 1.64% 1.03% 18.64% 12.37% 11.07% 30.28%

























% Rent Captured by a Community  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Minimum (million CA$) $2.65 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.04 $0.65
Maximum (million CA$) $22.03 $5.48 $5.14 $4.80 $1.71 $2.54 $1.60 $6.50 $6.62 $7.31 $41.14
Minimum (million CA$) $2.94 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.04 $0.90
Maximum (million CA$) $22.03 $6.48 $7.03 $6.56 $2.34 $3.47 $2.19 $6.50 $7.35 $8.74 $48.93
Minimum (million CA$) $3.24 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.04 $2.32









Figure 6. Community income stability (denoted by the coefficient of variation) 
for each fiscal regime under low, reference and high market price 
scenarios. 
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Fiscal regimes 5, 6 and 7 consistently provide maximum annual community 
incomes which are less than those under regime 8; however, regimes 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10, 
only provide maximum annual community incomes less than regime 8 under the low 
commodity market scenario.  
Despite this, fiscal regimes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 (those mentioned in the 
previous paragraph) all have more volatile annual community incomes and capture less 
overall rent than fiscal regimes 1 and 8. 
The results show that all ten negotiated IBAs could be designed to collect 
significantly more revenue while still ensuring that the project is economically viable. To 
illustrate this, a hypothetical fiscal regime was evaluated along with the ten IBAs. The 
hypothetical regime (regime 11) generated significantly more revenue. The hypothetical 
regime uses a combination of fixed payments and a profits-based royalty that is set at a 
higher level of 4.5% (tier 1) and 39% (tier 2), after the investors recover their initial 
investment in the project. This fiscal regime collects 30.45% of the rent for the 
community under the reference case scenario. Under the low and high price scenarios, 
the community collects 46.7% and 32.9% of the rent respectively.  
In comparison to fiscal regime 1 – the best performing negotiated fiscal regime, 
regarding its ability to capture rent for communities – fiscal regime 11 provides less 
stable, but significantly higher payments to a community throughout the life of a project 
(Table 19 and Figure 6). Fiscal regime 11 yields maximum yearly payments between 
$41.14 and $71.34 million Canadian to the impacted community, while fiscal regime 1 
yields a maximum yearly payment of $22.03 million Canadian to the impacted 
community throughout the life of the project.  
Like regime 1, fiscal regime 11 provides a guaranteed minimum annual income to 
the community throughout the project’s life. However, since annual revenue provided 
through regime 11 is sensitive to project economics, regime 11 provides a lower 
guaranteed minimum annual income to the community compared to regime 1. Under 
regime 11, the guaranteed minimum annual income to the community ranges between 
$0.65 million and $2.32 million Canadian, whereas fiscal regime 1 provides a minimum 
annual income between $2.65 million and $3.24 million Canadian. 
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4.4. Discussion of Results 
This study illustrates that the fiscal regimes in the ten negotiated IBAs evaluated 
collect a small proportion of the economic rent generated from mineral development and 
therefore more aggressive fiscal regimes could be used to collect significantly more 
revenue for the community while still ensuring the economic viability of the mining 
project. These results suggest that communities need to design better fiscal regimes in 
their IBAs to collect a larger share of mining project benefits.   
While the design of an optimal fiscal regime is beyond the parameters of this 
paper, several observations can be made. First, it is important for each community 
negotiating an IBA to develop an economic model of the proposed project to estimate 
the project rents; the community thereby identifies the magnitude of revenue that can be 
collected while still ensuring that the project is feasible from the perspective of the 
investors. This, in effect, identifies the size of the net project benefit that can be shared 
with the community. Second, the community needs to identify its fiscal objectives 
regarding items such as the stability of revenue flow and magnitude of revenue collected 
to assist it in designing the fiscal regime, and then evaluate fiscal options relative to 
these objectives by testing different regime options in the model, that is specific to the 
proposed project. Based on the evaluation of the fiscal regimes in this paper, a fiscal 
regime that combines fixed payments with a profit-based royalty, similar to the 
hypothetical regime (11), is an attractive option for consideration, as a minimum 
guaranteed income is ensured and windfall profits can be captured. Third, the 
community needs to consider the relationship between the proposed fiscal regime and 
other community objectives such as employment, local purchasers, community 
infrastructure and environmental mitigation that could be included in the IBA. These 
other provisions may reduce the rent available to be collected under the fiscal regime 
and the community will need to carefully assess the trade-off between the fiscal 
objectives and other IBA components. 
Admittedly, due the confidential nature of IBAs, the number of mining fiscal 
regimes evaluated in this chapter is small and more evaluations would be helpful along 
with more analysis of the dynamics of negotiations, to better understand why various 
fiscal regimes are developed. Evidence assessed in this study suggests that base metal 
mining IBAs, negotiated to date, have not been particularly effective at collecting a fair 
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share of the benefits of resource projects for the impacted communities, and that there is 
significant potential for communities to improve the fiscal provisions in IBAs by 
undertaking better analysis of project economics and revenue options. 
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Chapter 5. Recommendations and Conclusion 
5.1. Introduction 
This report identifies and describes the various fiscal instruments and systems 
that can be used to share privately accrued revenue from resource development with 
impacted communities. Furthermore, the relative advantages and disadvantages 
associated with employing each tool is discussed, and a set of qualitative and 
quantitative evaluative criteria is proposed. The quantitative evaluation framework was 
then used to assess the performance of alternative fiscal regimes levied for the base 
metal mining sector in British Columbia, Canada. Overall, this assessment of alternative 
fiscal regimes was completed to gain insight into the process of designing an optimal 
fiscal regime.  
5.2. Recommendations  
There is no single fiscal regime that is optimally designed for all natural resource 
sectors, projects, locations and/or communities. Instead, fiscal regimes should be 
designed to reflect and respond to unique project economics, community objectives, and 
political contexts. The following recommendations are provided to assist communities 
through the process of negotiating and designing well-informed fiscal regimes for 
resource development projects through IBAs.  
First, communities who are in the process of negotiating IBAs should identify a 
set of community fiscal objectives for fiscal regime-dependent parameters such as the 
stability of revenue flow and magnitude of revenue collected. These objectives can then 
be converted into an evaluative framework to assess alternative fiscal regimes. If 
preferred, communities may also weight these set of objectives or evaluative criteria to 
further refine the evaluation process. 
Second, during the negotiation process, the negotiating community should 
develop an economic model of the proposed resource project to illustrate project 
economics and generate an estimation of project rent. This model can then be used in 
conjunction with the developed evaluative framework to assess fiscal regime options and 
inform the final design of the levied fiscal regime. Following these steps maintains 
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community-specific objectives as a focal point throughout the fiscal regime design 
process, thereby ensuring that the final, levied fiscal regime aligns with the needs and/or 
objectives of the impacted community.  
Lastly, negotiating communities may want to expand on the aforementioned 
process to incorporate the provision of non-monetary benefits from an IBA – such as 
community infrastructure development, environmental mitigation, preferential 
procurement practices, employment, and training. Non-monetary provisions may reduce 
the rent available to be collected under the fiscal regime and so the negotiating 
community will need to assess trade-offs between fiscal objectives and non-monetary 
objectives.  
5.3. Conclusion  
An impact benefit agreement can be a valuable tool used to ensure an equitable 
sharing of monetary and/or non-monetary benefits from resource development activities 
with impacted communities and manage or mitigate project impacts beyond basic 
regulatory requirements. From the perspective of a project proponent, IBAs may help to 
foster community support for a given project and therefore garner the social licence to 
operate. However, the largely confidential nature of IBAs has created a situation in which 
opportunities for social learning and assessing success have become limited.  
This report attempts to distill practical recommendations for designing fiscal 
regimes in IBAs. To accomplish this, fiscal instruments and systems for extractive 
industries were identified, described, and qualitatively assessed based on a set of 
potential community objectives. Then, using a quantitative evaluative framework, 
alternative fiscal regimes for the base metal mining sector were evaluated using a 
discounted cash flow (DCF) mining model based on a representative mine.  
Fiscal instruments have unique characteristics that influence natural resource 
development, management processes and outcomes, profits, and ultimately, the 
revenues shared with impacted communities. Analyzing each potential fiscal instrument 
against the evaluative criteria of revenue generating potential, administrative efficiency, 
neutrality, stability of income, and level of community involvement in project decision-
making, it is clear that no individual instrument out-performs others in all evaluative 
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areas; trade-offs exist. Generally, a neutral fiscal instrument, that maximizes revenue 
raising potential, is administratively inefficient and provides unstable income to 
communities, and vice versa.  
To balance trade-offs between different community objectives or evaluative 
criteria, numerous fiscal instruments can be combined into a fiscal regime. Based on the 
quantitative evaluation of alternative fiscal regimes (Chapter 4), it may be attractive to 
design a fiscal regime with both a stable, fixed payment component as well as a more 
neutral profit-based component. Doing this ensures a minimum guaranteed income to 
the community while still allowing windfall profits to be captured.  
Additionally, an analysis of alternative fiscal regimes negotiated for the base 
metal mining sector in B.C. suggests that negotiated base metal mining IBAs have not 
been effective at collecting a fair share of resource revenue for impacted communities. In 
fact, there seems to be potential for communities to negotiate and levy more aggressive 
fiscal regimes while ensuring project viability. To quantify a fair share (resource rent) and 
ensure efficient resource development, it is suggested that communities develop and 
utilize an economic model of the proposed project to analyze project economics and 
design a well-informed fiscal regime.  
 Fiscal regime design for IBAs takes place during the agreement negotiation 
process. As with any negotiation, the outcomes are influenced by respective bargaining 
power, existing power dynamics, and other contextual factors. Consequently, while this 
report provides practical recommendations for designing fiscal regimes in IBAs, it is 
important to acknowledge that negotiating a fiscal regime is a complex process that 
requires contextual dynamics to be taken into account when developing a negotiation 
strategy (Caine & Krogman, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2016; Peterson St-Laurent & Billon, 
2015; Szablowski, 2011). These issues are beyond the parameters of this paper, but it is 
important to acknowledge their importance in determining the structure of fiscal regimes 
and the components of an IBA. 
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